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RATIFICATION BY SILENCE
Warren A. Seavey t
The cases in which the language of ratification is used by the
courts to determine the liabilities of principals fall into three groups.
The first, the one chiefly to be considered here, consists of cases in
which one for whom another purported or, in the case of acts of serv-
ice, intended to act, voluntarily becomes a party to the obligations
which would have been created by the transaction if he had authorized
it. For present purposes this may be described as a voluntary ratifica-
tion, since the affirmance of the transaction results from the willingness
of the ratifier to become a party to the transaction and is not imposed
upon him because of what he does or fails to do.
The second group of cases in which ratification is found are those
in which ratification is imposed because of inconsistent conduct. Here
the ratifier's conduct, said by the courts to be an affirmance by him, is
of one of two types. First where, knowing the facts, he receives prop-
erty which is the product of a prior unauthorized transaction or, having
received such property, he learns the facts before he has changed his
position, and fails to return it. In imposing upon him the liabilities of
ratification, the courts create a remedy alternative to an action for con-
version or for restitution which otherwise the person whose property
was received would have had. The receiver or holder in such a case
may or may not be willing to be a party to the transaction but he be-
comes responsible as if he were, irrespective of his consent, because of
his conduct in receiving or failing to return the property. The second
type of cases where there is "forced" ratification includes those in which,
without receiving property, a purported principal does an act which is
inconsistent with the non-existence of affirmance, as where he brings
an action upon a prior contract purported to be made for him,. or
brings an action against the pseudo agent for the proceeds of the trans-
action, or brings against a third person an action which would be justi-
fied only if the prior transaction were authorized or ratified. Again,
willingness to be a party to the earlier affair is immaterial. The re-
sulting liabilities are created by the courts despite any unwillingness.
The results in the third group of cases do not depend upon a doc-
trine of ratification but upon the rules of estoppel. In these cases, the
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purported principal either does something which misleads the third
person into believing that the prior transaction was authorized or rati-
fied or, more frequently, does nothing to destroy the other's belief that
the act was authorized. In both cases there is the failure to discriminate
between ratification and estoppel, similar to that which has led to the
confusion of apparent authority and estoppel. Although properly the
liability in such cases should be limited to the harm caused by the mis-
leading conduct, the technique involves finding ratification with its nor-
mal consequences in favor of the one asserting the estoppel.
MENTAL ACT AS A BASIS FOR LIABILITY
Cases involving all three types of the situations outlined above
have been cited to support a rule that "ratification can be effected by
silence." Since the reasons for such a rule differ in the three types of
situations, it seems worthwhile to sort out the cases in order to deter-
mine whether the rule exists in the case of the purely voluntary type
of affirmance where there is neither inconsistent conduct nor estoppel.
In this type of situation, if ratification follows it is only because of the
mental act of the ratifier, that is, his willingness to become a party to
the earlier transaction.
It is frequently assumed that one cannot change his legal relations
with another to whom he owes no duty merely by willingness to do so.
Thus, one who is not responsible for harm to another does not be-
come liable by being willing to be or even, unless for consideration, by
so agreeing. One does not become a criminal if there is no manifesta-
tion of approval before or at the time. Ordinarily, one who receives
an offer does not, in the absence of a prior relation with the offeror,
accept the offer by remaining silent, although intending to accept.
However, there are situations in which willingness, aside from
activity, manifestation or communication, may make a difference in
one's rights and liabilities. Thus, if I consent that another should enter
my land or take my chattels, I cannot complain if he does so whether
or not he otherwise would be a trespasser and whether or not I have
expressed my consent to him.' One who takes my chattel with a lar-
cenous state of mind is not a thief if at the time I am willing that he,
or anyone, should take it.2 Again, an offer may be made in such terms
that it can be accepted without either communication or external mani-
festation and although there was no prior relation between the parties.'
Thus one may become a fiduciary by intending to accept the obligations
1. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §49, as amended (Supp. 1948).
2. McDaniel's Case, Foster Cr. Law 121, 127 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1755).
3. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §72(l) (1932); WILLISTON, CONT.ACTS §91 (2d
ed. 1936).
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of an agency power conferred upon him; " one may take possession of
land or chattels upon which he is or which is in his physical control
merely by an intent to take possession; a servant leaves the "scope of
his employment" by deciding to .act wholly for his own purposes.5
VOLUNTARY RATIFICATION
In this category of situations in which an act of the will can change
legal relations are those in which it is held that one ratifies by consent-
ing to be a party to a prior transaction. It has never been doubted
that consideration is unnecessary. 6 It is also clear that a statement
either to the third person or to the pseudo agent is sufficient as to
both,7 and the cases seem to indicate that, unlike authorization, ratifi-
cation does not require communication to either: all that is needed is
evidence having probative value which indicates a willingness to
affirm.8
Probative value of silence. That a person's failure to repudiate a
prior transaction in which his property or name is involved has pro-
bative -value to indicate his assent is consistent with, and limited by,
the generalization that a failure to take action is evidence of a state of
mind wherever the situation is such that action would have been taken
by the ordinary person who did not have such a state of mind. Thus
"a failure to assert a fact, when it would have been natural to assert it,
amounts in effect to an assertion of the non-existence of the fact." 9
Silence following a communication stating facts or liabilities indicates
consent to the truth of the statements where "the circumstances are
such that a dissent would in ordinary experience have been expressed if
the communication had not been correct." 3o
This generalization has many illustrations. Thus, if the failure
to respond to an offer to make a bilateral contract does not result in the
4. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 15 (1933).
5. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 235, illustration 1 (1933).
6. Ernshaw v. Roberge, 86 N.H. 451, 170 Atl. 7 (1934); Grant v. Beard, 50
N.H. 129 (1870); McClintock v. South Penn Oil Co., 146 Pa. 144, 23 Atl. 211
(1892); Evans v. Ruth, 129 Pa. Super. 192, 195 Atl. 163 (1937).
7. Sheffield v. Ladue, 16 Minn. 388 (1871).
8. "A ratification, though it must be evidenced by external demonstrations, is
merely an act of the mind. It is a volition or determination to abide by and adopt
the act of another. The validity of a ratification, where no act of another is
founded upon it, does not depend upon its being communicated." Morton, J., in Bayley
v. Bryant, 24 Pick. 198, 203 (Mass. 1842). Cases like Shinn v. Smiley, 1 N.J.
Misc. 459, 122 Atl. 531 (Ch. 1922), in which it was held that a letter by the purported
principal to his attorney could not be construed as an affirmance, can be accepted
on the ground that there was no intent that it should be definitive.
9. 2 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1042 (2d ed. 1923).
10. 2 id. § 1071.
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formation of a contract, it is either because communication or an act in-
tended to result in communication (e.g., the mailing of a letter) is a
necessary part of acceptance, or because the failure to respond would
not normally indicate a willingness to accept the offer. In a proper
case, that is, where the offer indicates that the acceptance may be by
silence and the offeree intends his silence as an acceptance, it has been
held that the contract has been completed even where there has been no
receipt of property or prior relations between the parties."1 In the
agency field, failure to object to the doing of an 'act has frequently been
held to create authority to do future acts,'" and in many of the cases
the court finds that the principal is bound either because he has author-
ized or has ratified, it being unimportant in a particular case which has
occurred.
However, the acceptance of the idea of ratification by acquiescence
has not been without some hesitation. This is particularly true where
the original act was done by one who was not an agent. This, in spite
of Story's statement that "acquiescence of the principal may well give
rise to the presumption of an intentional ratification" where the agency
actually exists, although "the presumption is far less strong, and the
mere fact of acquiescence may be deemed far less cogent, where no such
relation of agency exists. . . ." "a The same result was reached by
Mechem, who states that liability may be based purely on the assent of
the principal, and that the question whether there is ratification without
affirmative conduct depends merely upon the weight of the evidence,
which will vary with the situation. 4 There are a number of early
cases, and a few later ones, which indicate difficulty in the acceptance of
the idea where there is not something more than a failure to repudiate,
particularly true where the initial act was done by a stranger.'5 It must
be admitted also that, in most of the cases where ratification has been
found, not only was the prior act done by one who was an agent, and
in many cases one who may have been authorized, but also there was
something received by the principal or there were elements of estoppel
which would support the result aside from the failure to repudiate.
Many of the decisions are rested upon these grounds in whole or in
11. WILLiSTON, CoN-aAcrs § 91(a) (2d ed. 1936).
12. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §54 (1933); Grossman v. Calonia Land & Imp.
Co., 103 N.J.L. 98, 134 Atl. 740 (Ct. Err. & App. 1926) ; Leslie v. Bard, 57 N.E.2d
804 (Ohio App. 1944). See also cases citing with approval RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§ 15, e.g., Brown v. Schmitz, 237 Iowa 418, 424, 22 N.W.2d 340, 343 (1946).
13. STORY, AGENCY 300 (9th ed. 1882).
14. MaCHEM, AGENCY § 468 (2d ed. 1914).
15. See cases cited id. n.21.
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part. But it is now clear that there may be ratification through
acquiescence alone," although in many of the cases in which
16. Atherton v. Beaman, 256 Fed. 871 (D. Mass. 1919) (shareholders failed to
object to the act of a director in using their money to pay his own bills) ; Standard
Oil Co. v. Lyons, 130 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1942) (paraphrasing RESTATEm:ENT,
AGENCY § 94 (1933). The question was whether an employment had begun in Iowa
or Illinois, the rights of the deceased employee being dependent upon this; held
that the employment had begun where the unauthorized agent of the employee had
contracted on his account); Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1936)
semble (paraphrasing RESTATEmENT, AGENCY §94 (1933)); Mobile & M. Ry. v.
Jay, 65 Ala. 113 (1880) semrble; Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Coffman Bros., 96
Ark. 505, 132 S.W. 654 (1910) (contract to supply goods to third persons) ; Baker
v. Brown & Hackney Inc., 137 Ark. 530, 215 S.W. 578 (1919) (improper sale by
agent); Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc'y v. Belcher, 4 Cal.2d 268, 48 P.2d 681
(1935) (assignment of corporate asset coming to the knowledge of a director not
present at directors' meeting); Heck v. Heck, 63 Cal.App.2d 470, 147 P.2d 110
(1944); Gaine v. Austin, 58 Cal. App.2d 250, 136 P.2d 584 (1943); Mayfield v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 16 Cal. App.2d 611, 61 P.2d 83 (1936) (affirmance
of insurance by the assured); Union Gold Mining Co. v. Rocky Mountain Nat.
Bank, 1 Colo. 531 (1872) (agent borrowed money for his own purposes; held that,
although there was no duty by the principal to repudiate promptly, his silence was
evidence upon which a jury could find ratification) ; Lynch v. Smyth, 25 Colo. 103,
54 Pac. 634 (1898) (court distinguishes between the inference to be drawn from
silence and the estoppel which may result where a principal does not act promptly) ;
Harris v. Underwood, 208 Ga. 247, 66 S.E.2d 332 (1951) (unauthorized sale);
Holmes v. Morris, 341 Ill. 351, 173 N.E. 402 (1930) (gratuitous conveyance by
purported agent) ; Federal Land Bank v. Union Bank, 228 Iowa 205, 290 N.W. 512
(1940) (citing RESTATE NT, AGENCY § 94 (1933)); Marion Say. Bank v. Leahy,
200 Iowa 220, 204 N.W. 456 (1925) (altered note; ratification and estoppel dis-
tinguished) ; Burlington Gas Light Co. v. Greene, Thomas & Co., 22 Iowa 508
(1867); Pacific Ry. v. Thomas, 19 Kan. 256 (1877) (physician called by employee
had already rendered the services) ; Elk Valley Coal Co. v. Thompson, 150 Ky. 614,
150 S.W. 817 (1912) semble (although, where the principal has not derived any
benefit and no third person has suffered loss, evidence of ratification by acquiescence
must be clearly shown); Mangum v. Bell, 20 La. Ann. 215 (1868); Pitts v.
Shubert, 11 La. 181 (1837) (sale by purported agent) [cf. Watson v. Schmidt, 173
La. 92, 136 So. 99 (1931) (proceeds of the sale of principal's property used to pay
a debt of principal)]; Hix v. Eastern S.S. Co., 107 Me. 357, 78 Atl. 379 (1910)
(acquiescence to agreement for limited liability under a bill of lading for goods
shipped by agent); Auto Outing Co. v. McFrederick, 146 Md. 106, 125 Atl. 886
(1924) semble (where failure to dissent, "the ordinary intelligent man would be
justified in inferring that the principal assented . . . .") ; Jackson & Co. v. Great
Am. Indemnity Co., 282 Mass. 337, 185 N.E. 359 (1933) (possibly estoppel) ; Child,
Jeffries & Co. v. Bright, 283 Mass. 283, 186 N.E. 571 (1933) semble (no ratifica-
tion when mere delay in notifying payee of check drawn by treasurer for his personal
indebtedness, where no elements of estoppel); Sherman v. Fitch, 98 Mass. 59
(1867) (transfer of corporate property) ; Amory v. Hamilton, 17 Mass. 102 (1821)
semble (no ratification found) ; Burns v. Kelley, 41 Miss. 339 (1867) semble (where
not such acquiescence that ratification could be inferred) ; Cannon v. Gibson, 162 Mo.
App. 386, 142 S.W. 730 (1912) semble (acquiescence not found) ; Lorie v. Lumber-
men's Ins. & Cas. Co., 8 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Mo. App. 1928) (no ratification found, the
court holding it to be a jury question) ; St. Louis Gunning Adv. Co. v. Wanamaker
& Brown, 115 Mo. App. 270, 90 S.W. 737 (1905) (well reasoned opinion dis-
tinguishing between ratification and estoppel) ; Renland v. First Nat. Bank of Grass
Range, 90 Mont. 424, 4 P.2d 488 (1931) semble; Obherne v. Burke, 50 Neb. 764,
70 N.W. 387 (1897) (affirmance of a guarantee); State v. Farmer's & Merchant's
Bank, 125 Neb. 247, 254 N.W. 675 (1934) semble (citing RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§ 94 (1933)) ; Wright v. Boynton & Hayward, 37 N.H. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 319 (1858)
(held that the trial court should have charged that if defendant failed to dissent
to an agreement purporting to make him a member of a partnership, he ratified, but
judgment for defendant was sustained) ; Erie R.R. v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 114
N.J.L. 216, 176 Atl. 377 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935) semble (ratification not found be-
cause of lack of knowledge); Warren v. New York Life Ins. Co., 40 N.M. 253,
58 P.2d 1175 (1936) (ratification of acceptance of check by principal's wife);
Pollitz v. Wabash Ry., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721 (1912); Barter v. Barrett,
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this is stated, there were other grounds for holding ratificationY.17
Supporting the view that ratification can be inferred merely from
a failure to repudiate are those cases where a tort has been committed,
usually by an employee acting beyond the scope of employment. In
such cases there is no chance of estoppel and, normally, no receipt of
benefit; the acquiescence results only in the liability of the principal,
and, presumably, the discharge of the servant from liability to the
principal. Because of this, the courts require clear evidence of the ap-
proval of the wrongful conduct. This is ordinarily not found merely
from the continuance of the servant in the employment.:, However,
continuance in employment has some evidential value which may be
considered with other evidence,' and one court has suggested that it
would be sufficient if an "ordinary prudent employer" would have dis-
charged the employee upon hearing the facts.2" If approval is found,
186 App. Div. 715, 174 N.Y. Supp. 779 (1st Dep't 1919) (retention of receipt with
unauthorized terms); Curtis v. Thomson, 166 Misc. 870, 2 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct.
1937) (one of two grounds of decision); Depot Realty Syndicate v. Enterprise
Brewing Co., 87 Ore. 560, 171 Pac. 223 (1918) (extension of lease) ; Prentice v.
Unemployment Compensation Board, 161 Pa. Super. 630, 56 A.2d 295 (1948) semble;
Hall v. Crawford & Delphenis Co., 11 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (use by
an officer of a corporation of money to pay his own debts); Miles Realty Co. v.
Dodson, 8 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (agreement to subordinate corporate
lien to the interests of another) ; Piedmont Mt. Airy Guano Co. v. Buchanan, 146
Va. 617, 131 S.E. 793 (1926); Thompson v. Murphy, 60 W. Va. 42, 53 S.E. 908
(1906) semble; Parish v. Reave, 63 Wis. 315, 23 N.W. 568 (1885) semble (failure to
repudiate a conveyance) ; Zuehlke v. Ott, 221 Wis. 89, 92-93, 266 N.W. 242, 243-44
(1936) semble (quoting RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 94, comment b (1933)) ; Common-
wealth Tel. Co. v. Paley, 203 Wis. 447, 233 N.W. 619 (1930) (sale by agent);
Waisner v. Hasbrouck, 34 Wyo. 61, 241 Pac. 703 (1925) (agent took note instead
of money; action by principal against agent).
17. Many cases in which the rule of Section 94 of the Restatement of Agency is
said to apply are based upon the taking or refusal to surrender property obtained by
the unauthorized act. See, e.g., Farvour v. Geltis, 91 Cal. App.2d 603, 205 P.2d
424 (1949) ; Southern Motors v. Krieger, 86 Ga. App. 574, 71 S.E.2d 884 (1952);
Will v. Hughes, 172 Kan. 45, 238 P.2d 478 (1951); Prelow v. Dorian, 53 So.2d
467 (La. App. 1951); Yarnall v. Yorkshire Worsted Mills, 370 Pa. 93, 87 A.2d
192 (1952).
18. Sheaf v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.R.R., 162 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1947)
(unprovoked assault); McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal. App.2d 249, 171 P.2d 85
(1946) (assault by special police officer, committed for master's benefit) ; Rosenberg
v. J. C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App.2d 609, 86 P.2d 696 (1939) (defamation) ; Turner
v. American Dist. T. & M. Co., 94 Conn. 707, 711, 110 Atl. 540, 544 (1920) semble
(battery: continuance in employment "is too readily open to explanation on other
grounds"); Parry v. Davison Paxon Co., 87 Ga. App. 51, 73 S.E.2d 59 (1942)
(intent to rob); .. J. Newberry Co. v. Faulconer, 248 Ky. 59, 58 S.W.2d 217
(1933) (defamation) ; Pruitt v. Goldstein Millinery Co., 169 Ky. 655, 184 S.W. 1134
(1916) (defamation) ; Kane v. Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co., 200 Mass. 265, 86 N.E.
302 (1908) (defamation of a rival) ; Craft v. Magnolia Stores Co., 161 Miss. 756, 138
So. 405 (1931) (defamation of customer, for servant's own purposes); Fisher v.
Hering, 88 Ohio App. 107, 97 N.E.2d 553 (1948) (assault); Tauscher v. Doern-
becher Mfg. Co., 153 Ore. 152, 56 P.2d 318 (1936) semble (employer believed
servant justified in assault).
19. Sandoval v. Southern Cal. Enterprises, 98 Cal.App.2d 240, 219 P.2d 928
(1950) ; Saberton v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 66 N.E.2d 224 (1946) ; Gantt v.
Belk-Simpson Co., 172 S.C. 353, 174 S.E. 1 (1934).
20. Cobb v. Simon, 119 Wis. 597, 97 N.W. 276 (1903) (false arrest).
19541
36 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103
as it may be from failure to disavow, the employer becomes liable."' In
many cases ratification was not found although the courts recognized
that ratification could be found from acquiescence.22  Consistent with
these cases are those where the plaintiff claims to have acquired rights
because of his uncommunicated affirmance.23
There are a few cases which have held that there can be no ratifi-
cation by acquiescence in the absence of some further element such as
the receipt of property or a change of position or, at least, the likelihood
of a change of position.24 These cases are, of course, in conflict with
those previously cited and I question whether they represent the pres-
ent rule in their own jurisdictions. Also, there is an occasional case
which denies that there can be ratification by acquiescence where the
other party knows that the agent is not authorized. 5 But there are
many others to the contrary.26
21. Central Ry. & B. Co. v. Cheatham, 85 Ala. 292 (1888) (libel); Pollock v.
Gantt, 69 Ala. 373 (1881) (abuse of process); Sandoval v. Southern Cal. Enter-
prises, 98 Cal.App.2d 240, 219 P.2d 928 (1950); Jameson v. Gavett, 22 Cal.App.2d
646, 71 P.2d 937 (1937) (employee was protecting employer's property); Penn-
sylvania Iron Works Co. v. Vogt Mach. Co., 139 Ky. 497, 96 S.W. 551 (1906)
(slander of competitor resulted in a favorable contract) ; Odom v. Tally, 160 Miss.
797, 134 So. 163 (1931) (malicious prosecution) ; Keidel v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 281
Pa. 289, 126 Atl. 770 (1924); Forbes & Allers v. Hagman, 75 Va. 168 (1881);
(false imprisonment).
22. Sheaf v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. R.R., 162 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1947)
(assault by servant not purporting to act for master) ; Shannon v. Simms, 146 Ala.
673, 40 So. 574 (1906) (malicious prosecution); Wofford Oil Co. v. Stauter, 26
Ala. App. 112, 154 So. 124 (1934) (prosecution ordered, stopped when facts were
known); Edwards v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 289 Ky. 375, 158 S.W.2d 935 (1942)
(defamation, not an affirmance to plead that the unauthorized servant told the
truth) ; Tucker v. Jerris, 75 Me. 184 (1883) (lack of full knowledge) ; Henriques v.
Franklin Motor Car Co., 260 Mass. 518, 157 N.E. 580 (1927) (malicious
prosecution; failure to stop it not sufficient) ; Bunting v. Goldstein, 283
Pa. 356, 129 Atl. 99 (1925) (defendant did not ask for plaintiff's further detention) ;
Dawson & Campbell v. Holt, 11 Lea 583 (Tenn. 1883) (silence alone not ratification
of slander as a matter of law); Rigby v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 160 Wis. 228,
151 N.W. 260 (1915) (false imprisonment where authorized agent asked for plain-
tiff's discharge from custody when he learned the facts) ; Eastern Counties Ry. v.
Broom, 6 Ex. 314 (1851) (not ratification to defend action for battery on ground
that servant was privileged).
23. Mayfield v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 16 Cal.2d 611, 61 P.2d 83 (1936)
(affirmance by assured of insurance policy) ; Argus v. Ware & Leland, 155 Iowa
583, 136 N.W. 774 (1912) (broker by mistake purchased too much wheat; on a rising
market the broker, to protect himself, sold and made a profit; held, that the customer
who had remained silent, but who testified that he had accepted the purchase, was
given the profit of the transaction).
24. Deane v. Gray, 109 Cal. 433, 42 Pac. 443 (1895) (defendant did not object
when told that physician called by unauthorized employee had looked to defendant
for payment) ; Britt v. Gordon, 132 Iowa 431, 108 N.W. 319 (1906) ; Guimbillot
v. Abat, 6 Rob. 284 (La. 1843); Beaumont Building Material Co. v. Barbe, 13
La. App. 335, 127 So. 484 (1930) ; Young v. Ellis, 149 La. 1001, 90 So. 373 (1922)
(perhaps only to effect that facts not sufficient to find ratification). See also Watson
v. Schmidt, 173 La. 92, 136 So. 99 (1931) (where one of the grounds of decision
was acquiescence); Embry v. Long, 256 Ky. 266, 75 S.W.2d 1036 (1934) semble;
Heyn v. O'Hagen, 60 Mich. 150, 26 N.W. 861 (1886) semble; White v. Langdon,
30 Vt. 599 (1858).
25. Hirzel Funeral Homes v. Equitable Tr. Co., 46 Del. 334, 83 A.2d 700 (1951).
26. Slater v. Berlin, 94 A.2d 38 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953); Public Say. Ins.
Co. v. Greenwald, 68 Ind. App. 609, 121 N.E. 47 (1918); Wilkins v. Waldo Lumber
Co., 130 Me. 5, 153 Atl. 191 (1931).
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Strangers. Where the one who acted was a stranger, some courts
have denied that there can be ratification merely by acquiescence."
Clearly, as a factual matter, it is ordinarily more easily found that the
principal desired to support one who in other matters was his repre-
sentative and had now acted only in an excess of zeal." But, if it is
found that the principal was willing to become a party to the transac-
tion, there is no rule of policy which would prevent the acquiescence
from resulting in ratification as it does where the willingness is ex-
pressed affirmatively.
Situations distinguished. Where a person sells the property of
another as his own, not purporting to be acting as an agent, there can
be no ratification in the sense in which that term is used here and an
indication of willingness to be bound by the sale would not result in
causing the owner to be subject to liability upon any warranty given.29
In such a case the owner has an action in quasi-contract against the
converter if he so desires and can receive the amount which the con-
verter received from the sale. 0  His failure to take action, however,
would not prevent him later from bringing action against the transferee
no matter how long the delay, although even here it is possible that
the owner would be bound by estoppel in some cases.
The estoppel cases should also here be distinguished from ratifica-
tion. If the principal notifies the agent that he does not desire the
transaction or if in any other way he indicates his disapproval, his
failure to notify the third person would not result in ratification,3 1 al-
though it might result in his being estopped.
Evidentiary matters. In deciding whether or not there has been
ratification through acquiescence, the relation between the principal and
27. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Coffman Bros., 96 Ark. 505, 132 S.W. 654
(1910) semble; Gunter v. Williams, 137 Ark. 530, 210 S.W. 136 (1919) semble;
California Bank v. Sayre, 85 Cal. 102, 24 Pac. 713 (1890) (defendant's name signed
to a note without authority) ; Ward v. Williams, 26 Ili. 447 (1861) seinble; Myers
v. Cook, 87 W. Va. 265, 104 S.E. 593 (1920) (on the facts it seems clear that there
was no consent). But cf. Miller v. Excelsior Stone Co., 1 Ill. App. 273 (1878)
sefllble. Contra, e.g., act of stranger can be ratified: Miller v. Chatsworth
Sav. Bank, 203 Iowa 411, 212 N.W. 722 (1927) ; Alexander v. Culbertson Irrigation
& W.P. Co., 61 Neb. 333, 85 N.W. 283 (1901) semnble; Warren v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 40 N.M. 253, 58 P.2d 1175 (1936) (affirmance of wife's receipt of check);
Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431 (1876) (where action was in good faith).
28. Ralphs v. Hensler, 97 Cal. 296, 32 Pac. 243 (1893) ; Holmes v. Morris, 341
IIl. 351, 173 N.E. 402 (1930) (acts done under power of attorney); Albiani v.
Bangs, 220 Mass. 20, 107 N.E. 406 (1914) (slight evidence sufficient where general
agent exceeded his powers); Compton v. Vaughan, 222 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1949);
Lemcke v. A. L. Funk & Co., 78 Wash. 460, 139 Pac. 234 (1914).
29. Bennett v. Holland Furnace Co., 116 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1940).
30. R sTATEmENT, RzsTrrUTION § 128 (1937).
31. Myers v. Cook, 87 W. Va. 265, 104 S.E. 593 (1920).
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the one who purported to act for him is important. Thus, as pointed
out above, it is easier to find ratification when he was an agent in other
matters than when he was a stranger. The extent of departure from
the authorized employment is important. It is also sometimes said
that it is easier to find an affirmance in actions between the principal
and agent than between the principal and third persons. I doubt
whether this is true. It is, however, difficult to prove from the cases
one way or the other.Y2 Obviously where there is an indication of
willingness aside from the mere delay, the acquiescence is easily
found33
The period during which there is inaction is of course important.
In general, the longer the period of inaction the easier it is to infer a
willingness to ratify. The issue is not primarily what a reasonable
person would feel, but the state of mind of the individual involved, al-
though, of course, in the absence of proof of idiosyncrasies the reason-
able man serves as a standard. It is not possible to evoke a rule for
these cases other than a statement that, in the absence of evidence
otherwise, a person is expected to act as a normal person would act
under the circumstances. Thus the difficulty of communication or of
taking effective action to notify the other party weakens the inference
of acquiescence.34 On the other hand, the normal desire of a person
to repudiate an action which deprives him of the possession of prop-
erty would strengthen the inference.85
Knowledge. As in other cases of ratification, no inference of
affirmance can be drawn where the principal has no knowledge of the
unauthorized act or not sufficient knowledge to enable him to make
an intelligent choice.30 However, knowledge can be inferred although
32. Such an inference might be drawn in the following cases: Holloway v.
Arkansas City Milling Co., 77 Kan. 76, 93 Pac. 577 (1908) ; Lemcke v. A. L. Funk
& Co., 78 Wash. 460, 139 Pac. 234 (1914).
33. Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1936) (asking for price of
goods sold by agent); Senger v. Malloy, 153 Wis. 245, 141 N.W. 6 (1913).
34. Ladd v. Hildebrant, 27 Wis. 135 (1870) (identity of other party was un-
known).
35. See Louisville Trust Co. v. Glenn, 65 F. Supp. 193, 202 (W.D. Ky. 1946);
Mapp v. Phillips, 32 Ga. 72, 80-81 (1860) (jury wrong in finding ratification from
a three months' wait before bringing suit against a purchaser who had paid agent
the money and absconded) ; Short v. Metz Co., 165 Ky. 319, 330, 176 S.W. 1144,
1149 (1915) (where a non-agent contracted to deliver a car, no ratification by
failing to repudiate promptly where the other party has already suffered his loss) ;
American Bank & Tr. Co. v. Farmers' El. & Mil. Co., 63 Mont. 612, 617, 208 Pac.
594, 595 (1922) (no ratification found in failure to disavow agent's promise, where
delay of a month; for acquiescence to result in ratification "the delay must be so
long continued that it can be accounted for on the theory that there has been some
affirmative act" [a more than doubtful statement on the authorities]).
36. See RESTATEmENT, AGENCY § 91 (1933); Turner v. American Dist. Tel. &
M. Co., 94 Conn. 707, 110 Atl. 540 (1920) (retention of servant without knowledge
of tort) ; Short v. Metz Co., 165 Ky. 319, 176 S.W. 1144 (1915) ; Elk Valley Coal
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there is no direct evidence as to the principal's information. 37 Further,
as in other cases, ratification can be effected where the principal knows
that he is unaware of all the incidents of the transaction."8 Likewise,
although there may be no ratification, there may be estoppel where
the principal does not investigate as a reasonable man should. 9
Where agent has duty of disclosure. Where an agent or other
fiduciary violates a duty to his principal, he has a duty of disclosing the
facts to the principal so that, unless the latter is made fully aware of
the situation, there will be no conclusive ratification, at least with ref-
erence to the agent. This is particularly true where the agent has
benefited or has sought to deal on his own account with the principal's
property. In such a case, the agent is not only under a duty to reveal
all the facts concerning the transaction, but is also required to see
that the principal has unprejudiced advice concerning the incidents of
the transaction. If the agent does not perform his duty in these re-
spects, the acquiescence of the principal will not result in ratification
as to the agent.4"
Judge or jury. As in other determinations of states of mind, the
question whether the failure to act indicated a willingness which causes
the affirmance is a matter for the jury unless the proved facts are clear
beyond a substantial doubt.4' Where the principal has received no
benefit and no person has suffered loss, it is sometimes said that af-
Co. v. Thompson, 150 Ky. 614, 150 S.W. 817 (1912) (no knowledge of promise to
pay compensation until service was performed); Tucker v. Jerris, 75 Me. 184
(1883); Auto Outing Co. v. McFrederick, 146 Md. 106, 125 Ati. 886 (1924);
Renland v. First Nat. Bank of Grass Range, 90 Mont. 424, 4 P.2d 488 (1930)
(knowledge that subagent had been employed without knowing more about contract
not sufficient); Beck v. Edwards & Lewis Inc., 141 N.J. Eq. 326, 57 A.2d 459
(Ch. 1948); Erie Ry. v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 114 N.J.L. 216, 176 AtI. 377
(Ct. Err. & App. 1935); Williams v. Storm, 46 Tenn. 203 (1869); Thompson v.
Murphy, 60 W. Va. 42, 53 S.E. 908 (1906).
37. REsrATm-ENT, AGENCY § 91 (1933); Lewis v. Guthrie, 63 Ind. App. 8, 111
N.E. 455 (1916) (knowledge of continuing trespasses) ; Miles Realty Co. v. Dodson,
8 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (held that under the circumstances there was
an inference of knowledge and burden was on principal to prove ignorance) ; Curry
v. Hale, 15 W. Va. 867 (1879).
38. Higgins v. Armstrong, 9 Colo. 38, 10 Pac. 232 (1885).
39. Bunn v. Laredo, 213 S.W. 320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); see RESTATEmmNT,
AGENCY § 103 (1933).
40. Adair v. Brimmer, 74 N.Y. 538 (1878) (beneficiary was not told of equitable
rights); Smith v. Howlett, 29 App. Div. 182, 51 N.Y. Supp. 910 (4th Dep't 1898)
(same); Matter of Long Island L. & T. Co., 92 App. Div. 1, 84 N.Y. Supp. 65
(2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 179 N.Y. 520, 71 N.E. 1138 (1904) and cases cited therein.
41. Mobile & M. Ry. v. Jay, 65 Ala. 113 (1880) (failure to dissent not ratifica-
tion as a matter of law, where principal had received nothing); Higgins v. Arm-
strong, 9 Colo. 38, 10 Pac. 232 (1885); St. Louis G.A. Co. v. Wanamaker & Brown,
115 Mo. App. 270, 90 S.W. 737 (1905) (judgment reversed for failure to leave to
jury).
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firmance must be clearly shown. 2 In cases, however, where the facts
are proved and the inference clear, the court may find ratification.
43
Formalities. As in other cases where the original transaction
must be effected by the performance of a formality, there can be in
general no ratification by acquiescence alone.4" However, in corpora-
tion cases, there appears to have been a considerable relaxation of
this, 45 so that in many cases the formality of directors' meetings, for
instance, is not insisted upon where the directors individually have
acquiesced or where all the stockholders have done so. It should be
noted further that, where there has been ratification by the receipt of
property or by bringing action or where there is estoppel, the for-
mality requirements are not insisted upon.
Receipt or retention of property. Many of the cases which are
cited as involving ratification by acquiescence are those in which the
principal has received something as a result of a transaction conducted
by the agent and thereafter has failed to notify either the third person
or the agent of his disapproval. Here the courts have ordinarily said
that failure to repudiate within a reasonable time coupled with a failure
to offer to return what was received is ratification and not merely evi-
dence of it. These cases are distinct from those dealt with in pre-
ceding paragraphs and do not come within the rule as to voluntary
ratification since, if there is a retention of property which should be
returned, ratification results automatically without reference to the
principal's desires. In most cases, however, the conduct of the prin-
cipal is evidence of an intent to ratify and the cases as a class, using
the language of the court rather than the facts, support the narrower
rule. It is to be noted that in these cases the state of mind of the de-
fendant is not important and hence the rule is frequently and properly
42. Elk Valley Coal Co. v. Thompson, 150 Ky. 614, 150 S.W. 817 (1912) (ratifi-
cation found).
43. Whitley v. James, 121 Ga. 521, 49 S.E. 600 (1904) (principal seeks to re-
cover land fourteen years after unauthorized sale of land by agent; held, ratification,
on demurrer; principal should have pleaded any special reason for delay); Marion
Say. Bank v. Leahy, 200 Iowa 220, 204 N.W. 456 (1925) (directed verdict proper).
44. See RESTATEmENT, AGENCY § 93(2) (1933).
45. Sharon Herald Co. v. Granger, 97 F. Supp. 295 (W.D. Pa. 1951); In re
Henry Harrison Co., 40 F. Supp. 733 (W.D.N.Y. 1941); Herring v. Fisher, 110
Cal. App.2d 322, 242 P.2d 963 (1952) ; Sandoval v. Southern Cal. Enterprises, Inc.,
98 Cal. App.2d 240, 219 P.2d 928 (1950) ; Be-Mac Transport Co. v. Michigan Ex-
press, Inc., 348 Ill. App. 460, 109 N.E.2d 370 (1952) ; Freeport Journal Standard
Pub. Co. v. Frederick W. Ziv Co., 345 Ill. App. 337, 103 N.E.2d 153 (1952);
Catlettsburg & B. Tel. Co. v. Bond, 262 Ky. 106, 89 S.W.2d 859 (1936); Webb v.
Duvall, 177 Md. 592, 11 A.2d 446 (1940); Lake Park Development Co. v. Paul
Steenberg Constr. Co., 201 Minn. 396, 276 N.W. 651 (1937); Drainage Dist. v.
Dawson County Irr. Co., 140 Neb. 866, 2 N.W.2d 321 (1942); Whitfield v. Kern,
122 N.J. Eq. 332, 192 Atl. 48 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937); Johnson v. Associated Seed
Growers Inc., 240 Wis. 278, 3 N.W.2d 332 (1942).
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stated that unless the principal promptly repudiates, it will-be assumed
that he intends to ratify. There are many relevant cases, of which a
few may be cited here.
46
These cases all have a restitutional base. Primarily, a purported
principal who has seized property through the unauthorized act of an-
other who purported to act for him is responsible to the owner of the
property if nothing more happens, and the third person at that moment
is entitled to a rescission of the transaction with the purported agent
and the restitution to him of the subject matter. The principal, there-
fore, has a duty to return the property to the owner and, if upon de-
mand he refuses to return it, assuming it to be a chattel, he would be
guilty of conversion and the third person would be entitled to an action
for the restitution of the property or its value. If the recipient refuses
to return the property, the courts also impose an alternative liability
in that the principal is subjected to liability on the original transaction
as if it were authorized. This is done even though the purported prin-
cipal disclaims such liability and prefers to be a converter. Not only
is he liable upon the contract but, if with knowledge of the facts he
retains the property, in this situation he would be responsible for fraud
or other wrongful means by which the property was obtained. It is
clear that although this is spoken of as ratification, this ratification is
an entirely different type from the "voluntary" type. Although in this
case the purported principal is free to choose, he can choose only be-
tween returning the property and being subject to liability; the choice
between a restitutional remedy and a remedy based on ratification lies
46. Gold Mining Co. v. National Bank, 96 U.S. 640 (1877); Smith v. Collins,
165 Fed. 148 (3d Cir. 1908) ; Lorie v. North Chicago City Ry., 32 Fed. 270 (C.C.N.D.
Ill. 1887); Waldteufel v. Sailor, 62 Cal. App.2d 577, 144 P.2d 894 (1944) (agree-
ment to give real estate agent a commission); Union Gold Mining Co. v. Rocky
Mt. Nat. Bank, 2 Colo. 565 (1875) (money was borrowed and expended for the
principal, the court finding an inference of ratification) ; Breed v. First Nat. Bank,
6 Colo. 235 (1882) (money borrowed to meet payrolls, the court saying that the fact
that money was used in a way advantageous to the principal was sufficient for the
jury to find ratification); Higgins v. Armstrong, 9 Colo. 38, 10 Pac.' 232 (1886)
(purchase of supplies for principal's business; delay of two months in repudiating;
held to afford the jury ground for finding ratification as well as authorization);
Pauly v. Madison County, 288 Ill. 225, 123 N.E. 281 (1919) (retention of building
supplies) ; Swartwout v. Evans, 37 Ill. 442 (1865) (sale of an interest in farm
machinery with part payment for repair bills for a period of two years); Public
Savings Ins. Co. v. Greenwald, 68 Ind. App. 609, 118 N.E. 556 (1918) (retention
of part payment from a sale) ; Watson v. Schmidt, 173 La. 92, 136 So. 99 (1931)
(proceeds of the sale of the principal's property used to pay a debt of the principal) ;
Dupre v. Splane, 16 La. 51 (1840) (receipt of part payment of a compromise settle-
ment) ; Maddux v. Bevan, 39 Md. 485 (1873) (proceeds of a settlement retained,
the court saying that silence may raise a "conclusive presumption of ratification");
Friend Lumber Co. v. Armstrong Bldg. Finish Co., 276 Mass. 361, 177 N.E. 794
(1931) (purchase of lumber by one of three directors); Meyer, Weiss & Co. v.
Morgan, 51 Miss. 21 (1875) (receiving proceeds of sale); Hart, Teneray & Co. v.
Dixon, 73 Tenn. (5 Lea) 336 (1880); Moran v. Knights of Columbus, 46 Utah 397,
151 Pac. 353 (1915) ; Higginbotham v. May, 90 Va. 233 (1893) (retaining note given
for a debt); Lemcke v. A. L. Funk & Co., 78 Wash. 460, 139 Pac. 234 (1914).
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with the other party. It is to be noted, however, that this has two
elements in common with the voluntary type of ratification. (1) There
is no ratification unless the principal knows the essential facts of the
initial transaction, and (2) he is free in choosing between alternate
liabilities. If we accept the language of the courts, this is voluntary
ratification, since it is usually stated that, unless the recipient promptly
repudiates, it will be assumed that he intended to ratify. This of course
is in the nature of a legal fiction, his de facto intent being completely
irrelevant.
Quasi estoppel. In many cases where the principal has learned
that someone has acted on his account, he had reason to know that if
he did not take action the third person would likely suffer a loss if rati-
fication were not to ensue. In some of these there is evidence that the
third person would suffer a loss. In other cases this evidence is not
introduced but undoubtedly is in the background. They differ from
the cases frankly based upon estoppel only in that the technique of rati-
fication is used and the principal becomes liable not for harm that he
has caused by failing to act, but on the theory that the transaction is
made effective. It is in this group of cases that the courts speak of the
duty on the part of the purported principal to act promptly if he does
not intend to be bound, and, as in the situation where property has been
received, the time during which the failure to act continues is of im-
portance. Likewise in these cases the fact that the principal did not
know all the incidents of the transaction becomes of less importance
since if he did know all the facts he may have been under a duty to
ascertain them in order to prevent harm to others. The cases cited
below include both those where the action is between the principal and
the third person and those where the issue is between the principal
and the agent.
47
47. E.g., Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Bradford Co., 294 Fed. 176 (2d Cir. 1923)
(two weeks of silence on a year's contract in a fluctuating market) ; Baker v. Brown
& Hackney, Inc., 144 Ark. 641, 215 S.W. 578 (1919) (employment of physician
with continued visits, ratification of past visits being for the jury) ; Gaine v. Austin,
58 Cal.App.2d 250, 136 P.2d 584 (1943) (affirmance of payment of mortgage where
the unauthorized agent used the proceeds and not disavowal for four months) ; King
v. Rea, 13 Colo. 69, 21 Pac. 1084 (1889) (affirmance of a purchase of land; where'
"the transaction may turn out a profit or loss according to the circumstances, the
principal must disavow the act within a reasonable time after notice") ; Hoosac
Mining & Milling Co. v. Donat, 10 Colo. 529, 16 Pac. 157 (1887) (lease of a mine
affirmed where the principal knew the other party would work it); J. B. Owens
Pottery Co. v. Turnbull Co., 75 Conn. 628, 54 At. 1122 (1903) (unauthorized person
purchased goods in principal's name, the goods being later seized on an execution
by agent's creditor while in agent's possession) ; N. Owsley & Son v. Philip Wool-
hopter, 14 Ga. 124 (1853) semble (ratification might be implied even from silence
when the circumstances are such that the agent would suffer from silence if there was
no ratification); Weaver v. Ogletree, 39 Ga. 586 (1869) (failure to repudiate until
too late for the other party to take action against the purported agent) ; Whitley
v. James, 121 Ga. 521, 49 S.E. 600 (1904) (fourteen years delay after conveyance
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of land); Toledo, Wabash & Western Ry. v. Prince, 50 Ill. 26 (1869) (principal
knew that agent had employed a physician who was continuing to act); Johnston
v. Berry, 3 IIl. App. 256 (1878) (knowledge of agreement to pay the plaintiff from
principal's property) ; Freeport J.S. Pub. Co. v. Frederick W. Ziv Co., 345 Ill. App.
337, 103 N.E.2d 153 (1952) (knowledge that manager was entering into an un-
authorized transaction); Hogate v. Edwards, 65 Ind. 372 (1879) (knowledge of a
contract of employment); Indiana Die Casting Develop. Co. v. Newcomb, 184 Ind.
250, 111 N.E. 16 (1916) (agent had employed a physician); Terre Haute & I.R.R.
v. Stockwell, 118 Ind. 98, 20 N.E. 650 (1889) (same facts); National Life Ins.
Co. v. Headrick, 63 Ind. App. 54, 112 N.E. 559 (1916) (agent had employed an
attorney) ; Farwell & Co. v. Howard, 26 Iowa 381 (1868) (two years' silence after
mortgage given); Miller v. Chatsworth Say. Bank, 203 Iowa 411, 212 N.W. 722
(1927) (agent held not liable for unauthorized investment where he notified the
principal; decision based on ground of election and not estoppel); Alexander v.
Jones, 64 Iowa 207, 19 N.W. 913 (1884) (transfer of land with receipt of price) ;
Cleveland v. Westmoreland, 191 La. 863, 186 So. 593 (1939) (conveyance of mineral
interests) ; Da Ponte v. Ogden, 161 La. 378, 108 So. 777 (1926) (conveyance by
agent; no explicit mention of change of position); Woods, Slayback & Co. v.
Rocchi, 32 La. Ann. 210 (1880); Mangum v. Bell, 20 La. Ann. 215 (1868) (sale of
cotton) ; Starr & Howland v. Zacharie & Co., 18 La. 517 (1841) (extension of time
on a note given by agent); McNeely v. Dave Lumber Co., 18 La. App. 672, 137
So. 607 (1931) (agreement to pay debt of another) ; Foster v. Rockwell, 104 Mass.
167 (1870) (purchase by agent, delay until after goods were shipped); Irving
Tanning Co. v. Shir, 295 Mass. 380, 3 N.E.2d 841 (1936) (promise to pay for goods
shipped to a third person) ; Jackson & Co. v. Great Am. Indemnity Co., 282 Mass.
337, 185 N.E. 359 (1933) (denial of liability which would have excused proof of
loss by insured); Sullivan v. Bennett, 261 Mich. 232, 246 N.W. 90 (1933) (failure
of broker to sell shares; held, ratification in favor of a broker as a matter of law) ;
Bacon v. Bankers' Trust & Say. Bank, 143 Minn. 318, 173 N.W. 719 (1919) (em-
ployment of plaintiff to knowledge of defendant's directors) ; Ammons v. Wilson &
Co., 176 Miss. 645, 170 So. 227 (1936) (delay of 12 days after receiving order taken
by unauthorized traveling salesman); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Paulding Stave Co.,
210 S.W. 438 (Mo. App. 1919); Danglade & R. Mining Co. v. Mexico-Joplin Land
Co., 190 S.W. 35 (Mo. App. 1916) (mortgage given to secure extension of time);
McLaren Gold Mines Co. v. Morton, 124 Mont. 382, 224 P.2d 975 (1950) (agent
had made a mining lease) ; Larson v. Marcy, 61 Mont. 1, 201 Pac. 685 (1921) (note
given for borrowed money); Hedeman v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 286 N. Y. 240. 36
N.E2d 129 (1941) (unauthorized employment of salesman); Goldstein v. Tank, 73
Misc. 300, 132 N.Y. Supp. 466 (County Ct. 1911) (unauthorized receipt of price by
salesman, delay of nearly three months); Curtis v. Thompson, 166 Misc. 870, 2
N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (citing RESTATEmENT, AGENcY § 94 (1933) (transfer
of assets from plaintiff's account to that of third person, alternative grounds of ratifi-
cation and/or of estoppel) ; Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Denner, 207 Okla.
416, 250 P.2d 217 (1952) (habit by agent of endorsing checks); Price v. Peeples,
66 Okla. 139, 168 Pac. 191 (1917) (delay of several months after entry of judgment
against principal) ; Montgomery v. Van Ronk, 328 Pa. 508, 195 Atl. 910 (1938)
(failure to object to broker's failure to follow instructions after notification by
broker) ; Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Lykens Merc. Co., 274 Pa. 206, 117 Atl. 780
(1922) (unauthorized contract for purchase); Sud-Rheinische Gesellschaft, M.B.H.
v. Rosedale Foundry & Mach. Co., 113 Pa. Super. 187, 172 Atl. 405 (1934) (delay
after receipt of goods purchased); Cole-Mclntyre-Norfleet Co. v. Holloway, 141
Tenn. 679, 214 S.W. 817 (1919) (failure to take action on order sent by solicitor) ;
State Life Ins. Co. v. Duke, 69 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (agreement to
be bound by decision in a parallel case); Wm. Cameron & Co. v. Gibson, 278 S.W.
522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (contract to build house on principal's land); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunhen, 248 S.W. 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) (unauthorized de-
livery of insurance policy after death of insured); Pittman & Harrison Co. v.
Knowlan Mach. & Supply Co., 216 S.W. 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (sale of grain,
with correspondence not indicating agent's lack of authority); Moses v. Archie
McFarland & Son, 230 P.2d 571 (Utah 1951) (salesman taking order "subject to
approval"); Winston v. Gordon, 115 Va. 899, 80 S.E. 756 (1914) (shareholders
remain silent after knowing of an assignment) ; Marshall v. McDermitt, 79 W. Va.
245, 90 S.E. 830 (1916) (unauthorized appearance by attorney) ; Francis H. Leggett
Co. v. West Salem Canning Co., 155 Wis. 462, 144 N.W. 969 (1914) (unauthorized
sale).
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